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CONCLUSION
The FTCA has waived the doctrine of sovereign immunity to a great
extent. However, the courts have hesitated to interpret the act as liberally
as was apparently intended by Congress. One of the basic purposes of the
act was to shift the burden of loss from the injured to the public. Since
the activity out of which the injury resulted was for public benefit, it is
only proper that the public bear the burden. The modern notion under
which losses are shifted to those who can best bear them should serve to
expand governmental liability under the FTCA.
The effectiveness of the FTCA has been hampered not only by the
strict interpretations of judges but also by the ambiguities within the act.
For example, the first exception to the waiver of immunity has caused
great frustration; interpretations of the term "discretionary" have been
inconsistent; the courts have used the inconsistency to base their decision
on the economic burden and the multiplicitous litigation threatened.
Undoubtedly the troublesome sections of the act will be simplified. But
even without the simplification, the FTCA represents great progress and
advancement from the antiquated idea of sovereign immunity.
INTERPRETATION OF SOME ASPECTS OF COL-
LAPSIBLE CORPORATION LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the enactment of section 117 (m) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 (now 341 of the 1954 Code) by Congress in 1950,1 there
existed certain tax advantages whereby ordinary income could be con-
verted into long term capital gain. This tax advantage was cultivated by
the creation of a temporary or collapsible corporation. This was done
most often in the motion picture and building construction industries.
For example, a corporation would be organized to produce a single motion
picture. The directors and actors would receive stock in lieu of salaries,
and said stock would then be sold, or the corporation liquidated, as soon
as the picture was completed. Under these conditions, any profits derived
from the sale of the stock or liquidation of the corporation would be tax-
able as capital gains at a maximum rate of twenty-five per cent.
In an effort to curtail the use of collapsible corporations, Congress de-
fined a collapsible corporation as one "formed or availed of" principally
for the purpose of manufacture, construction, purchase, or production of
property "with a view" to the sale or exchange of stock by its share-
1 64 Stat. 935 (1950), as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. 341 (1954).
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holders, or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the
corporation of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from
such property.2 Congress further provided, inferentially, that the gain
from the sale of stock or liquidation of a collapsible corporation should
be taxed as ordinary income rather than a capital gain.3 This tax definition
of a collapsible corporation illustrates some of the difficulties encountered
by the courts in interpreting legislation which is vague and uncertain.
PRINCIPAL INTENT
The statute provides that a corporation is collapsible when it is formed
or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction, production, or
purchase of property with a view to the sale of stock by its shareholders
or a distribution of corporate assets in liquidation to the shareholders. 4 In
explaining the statute, the courts have held that the requisite principal
intent need be only to manufacture, construct, produce, or purchase the
collapsible asset, rather than to maintain a view to engage in tax avoidance
through the collapse of the corporation. The word principally should be
read as modifying "manufacture, construction, or production of property"
rather than as modifying "with a view to."5 Under this interpretation, the
corporation may be collapsible if "manufacture, construction, or produc-
tion" was a principal corporate activity even if the "view to" collapse was
not the principal corporate aim when the corporation was "formed or
availed of." This explanation seems to be in agreement with Congress' ex-
pressed purpose to reduce certain advantages in the tax structure.6
THE REQUISITE VIEW TO COLLAPSE
The question of when a corporation is formed or availed of with a view
to the action described in section 341 has been a topic of repeated discus-
sions among tax experts. The regulations provide that a corporation is
formed or availed of with a view to the sale of the stock or liquidation of
the corporation before the realization of a substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived from such property, if the requisite view existed at
any time during the construction, production, etc., referred to in that
section.7 Thus, if the sale or distribution is attributable solely to circum-
stances which arose after the construction, etc. (other than circumstances
which reasonably could be anticipated at the time of such construction,
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m), now int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341 (a).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341 (b) (1) (A).
5 Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
6 Ibid.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (3) (1955).
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etc.), the corporation shall, in the absence of compelling facts to the con-
trary, be considered not to have been so formed or availed of. However,
if the sale is attributable to circumstances present at the time of the con-
struction, the corporation shall, in the absence of compelling facts to the
contrary, be considered to have been so formed or availed of., The Regu-
lations also provide that the requisite view exists if the sale of stock or the
distribution to shareholders is contemplated "unconditionally, condition-
ally, or as a recognized possibility."9 The statements expressed in the
Regulations have been followed in a number of court decisions.10
It is of primary importance to determine when corporate activity is
completed, because once the corporate activity is finished, the corporation
can no longer be so formed or availed of as to be a collapsible corporation
within the meaning of the aforementioned Regulations. In Weil v. Com-
missioner," a shopping center was found not to be completed since the
construction of a retaining wall and the completion of a parking lot pre-
vented effective operation. The lower court held that final completion
would not be fixed earlier than the time when the project was ready to
begin earning a substantial part of the net income.
Some courts have thought that the Regulations have adopted a too nar-
row interpretation of the statute. Judge Parker, writing the majority
opinion of the court in Burge v. Commissioner,12 held that it was not nec-
essary that the view exist at the time the corporation is formed, but rather
it is sufficient if it exists when the corporation is availed of. In Jacobson v.
Commissioner,'3 it was held that the corporation may be availed of at any
time during its corporate life. The effect of these two decisions is that a
corporation may be collapsible, notwithstanding the fact that the corpo-
rate activity is completed, provided the requisite view exists during the
corporate life. The Burge decision was followed in Glickman v. Commis-
sioner,14 where the court held the case indistinguishable from the Burge
case. In the Glickman case, the court concluded that the Regulation's in-
terpretation of the statute was too narrow, and was in fact more favorable
to the taxpayer. Payne v. Commissioner15 appears to favor the position of
the Regulations, but Sidney v. Commissioner6 goes even further than the
8 Ibid.
9 Treas. Reg. S 1.341-2 (a) (2) (1955).
10Carl B. Rechner, 30 T. C. 186 (1958); Max Mintz, 32 T. C. 723 (1959); Elizabeth
M. August, 30 T. C. 969 (1958); Robert T. Coates v. United States, 60-2 USTC 9673
(1960).
11252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
12253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). 13 2 T. C. 893 (1959).
14256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958), also Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir.
1960).
15 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959). 16 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960).
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Burge case or the Glickman case in using the availed of reference point.
The Sidney case also held that the predecessor section, 117 (in),
enacted on September 23, 1950, and made applicable to gains realized after
December 31, 1949, could constitutionally apply to a distribution on
January 30, 1950. Further, the court held that Congress could retroactive-
ly attach significance to views held prior to the statute, and that the
change from capital gain to ordinary income classification was essentially
a change in the rate of tax, and taxpayers must expect new revenue acts
every year.
POST-CONSTRUCTION MOTIVE INVOKED TO AVOID COLLAPSIBILITY
The next query to consider is the post-construction motive. It was con-
tended by the taxpayers in Mintz v. Commissioner,'7 that friction
prompted the sale of their stock and since this arose after completion of
construction, section 341 is inapplicable. The court denied this contention
on the grounds that "under the correct interpretation of the statute 'con-
struction' should be defined technically to mean all construction required
to perform the contract completely."' 8 Attempts to render section 341
inapplicable by the use of the post-construction motive have been unsuc-
cessfully invoked in a number of recent Tax Court decisions.19 In Jacob-
son v. Commissioner,20 the discovery of a crack in the wall in one of five
apartment buildings constructed by the taxpayers, which resulted in the
sale of stock by the shareholders within three or four months after com-
pletion of the project, and prior to realization by the corporation of a
substantial part of the net income to be derived from the project, was held
insufficient to render section 341 inapplicable. This was due to the fact
that the intent to make a profit before the corporation realized any sub-
stantial net income could have existed prior to, or during construction, as
well as after. Furthermore, the court rejected the contention of the tax-
payers which was based on the Regulations, because of prior court deci-
sions which held that section 341 is applicable at the time the corporation
is availed,21 which means at any time during the corporate life.22 In
Sterner v. Commissioner,23 disharmony arose between the shareholders
17 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
18 Id. at 740.
19 Carl B. Rechner, 30 T. C. 186 (1958); Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T. C. 893 (1959);
Ellsworth Sterner, 32 T. C. 1144 (1959).
20 32 T. C. 893 (1959).
21 Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958); Glickman v. Commissioner,
256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958).
22 Lewis S. Jacobson, 32 T. C. 893 (1959).
23 32 T.C. 1144 (1959).
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before construction began and continued until after construction was
completed. The court held that though this disharmony prompted the
sale, it was not sufficient reason to avoid the corporation being labeled
as collapsible.
A SUBSTANTIAL PART: REALIZED OR
UNREALIZED TAXABLE INCOME
Section 341 has confronted tax planners with the necessity of choosing
one of two conflicting meanings. The clause "prior to the realization of a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from such property"
can have two meanings. It has been held to mean: (1) that a substantial
part of the total taxable income must be realized before the sale or liqui-
dation,24 or (2) no substantial part of the total taxable income remains to
be derived from the property at the time of the sale or liquidation. 25 The
Congressional Committee reports do not make clear which of these inter-
pretations is intended. 26 In Commissioner v. Kelley,27 the Court of Appeals
found, that as is the case of the statute itself, the numerous general state-
ments in the Regulations using the phrase income to be derived can be
read both ways, although it can be assumed more readily that they refer
to the part of the income realized before the sale or exchange. Thus, it
was decided that effect would be given to that interpretation which more
naturally conveys the meaning of the words as they are written in the
statute. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court and held
that the phrase refers to the income realized before the sale of stock or
liquidation of the corporation.2 8 This result was in direct disagreement
with Abbott v. Commissioner29 upon which the Commissioner in the
Kelley case relied. In the Abbott case, the Court of Appeals, Third Cir-
cuit, misinterpreted the test applied by the Tax Court. The court con-
cluded that the test applied by the Tax Court was whether that part of
the total profit realized after dissolution was substantial, rather than
whether a substantial part of the total profit was realized prior to dissolu-
tion. This diagnosis of the Abbott decision was erroneous and surprised
the majority of the Tax Court in the Kelley case. Judge Kern writing for
the majority of the Tax Court in the Kelley case pointed out that in the
24 See McLean, Collapsible Corporations-The Statute and Regulations, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 55 (1953), for further discussion of this matter.
25 Ibid.
26 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950,
81st Congress, 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1950).
2 7 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
28 Ibid.
29 258 F.2d 537 (3rd Cir. 1958).
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Abbott case, the Tax Court inferentially held that 10.8 per cent already
realized at the date of liquidation was not a substantial part. By virtue of
the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in the Abbott case, the Com-
missioner in the Kelley case pointed out that since two-thirds of Island
Shores' income had not been acquired, the sale occurred prior to the reali-
zation by the corporation of a substantial part of the total taxable income
to be realized. This view was not shared by the Tax Court or the Court of
Appeals and the finding on this issue was in favor of the taxpayers in the
Kelley case. Consequently, there may be two substantial parts of a whole,
and a finding that the unrealized part of such taxable income is substantial,
does not preclude a finding that the realized part of such taxable income
is also substantial.
A SUBSTANTIAL PART-JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Section 341 also presents the problem as to what is substantial. The
statute uses the phrase a substantial part, but there is nothing in the legis-
lative history or in the factual setting that produced section 341 to indi-
cate that Congress designed the law with a fixed percentage in mind. 30
The Regulations go so far as to suggest that until the unrealized income
from the property is insubstantial in relation to the income that has been
realized, the realization may not be regarded as having been of a substantial
part of the taxable income.31
The courts have attempted to determined what "a substantial part" is in
four recent decisions. The first of these, Levenson v. United States,3 2 in-
volved the sale of trailers. When the corporation was organized, there
remained available to it, under contract, 3,495 trailers. When the corpora-
tion was liquidated on February 15, 1954, it had sold 1,795 trailers, and
had realized 51.37 per cent of the total anticipated taxable income. The
court held that this percentage realized prior to the sale of the stock con-
stituted a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from all of
the corporate property. Following closely on the heels of this first inter-
pretation was Abbott v. Commissioner, 3 decided in 1958. In that case, a
profit of $23,472.75 was realized by the corporation from the sale of land
prior to liquidation. Since the total profit was $215,349.20, the profit prior
to liquidation amounted to 10.84 per cent of the total profit. The court de-
cided that this did not constitute a substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived from such property, and thus held the corporation collaps-
ible.
30 S. REPT. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 88, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 546-47. H. R.
REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 97, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 449.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5 (c) (2) (1955).
32 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
33 258 F.2d 537 (3rd Cir. 1958).
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In August, 1961, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
affirmed the decision of the Tax Court in the Kelley case.a4 The court held
that one-third of the anticipated taxable income realized prior to the sale
of the stock of the corporation constitutes a substantial part of the total
taxable income to be derived from the property by the corporation. In
retrospect, the court held, there is "no litmus-paper test."3
Forty-four days after the Kelley case was affirmed, the same court an-
nounced its decision in Heft v. Commissioner.30 With the facts essentially
the same as those in the Kelley case, and a profit of 17.07 percent realized
prior to liquidation proceedings, the court determined the corporation to
be collapsible inasmuch as 17.07 per cent was not a substantial part of the
taxable income. The court in rendering its decision held that the meaning
of the word substantial rests upon an implied comparison between the de-
scribed subject and the larger unit. They said that to ascertain its meaning
in any particular concept, one must examine the frame of reference and
the purpose intended by the use of the term.
From an analysis of the foregoing cases, it can be seen that a substantial
part means somewhere between 17.07 per cent and 33 per cent of the tax-
able income to be derived from the property. It can readily be seen that
the door is beginning to close on this phrase. However, there is enough
room open to permit a still narrower breaking down of the phrase. Per-
haps in the near future, a specific percentage will be applied to determine
what is substantial. However, such an exact percentage must, by its very
nature, be statutory.
Even though a corporation is collapsible, under certain circumstances,
gain recognized by its shareholders with respect to its stock is still given
capital gains treatment.3 7
CONCLUSION
One can readily see the inadequacies of section 341 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. It is saturated with vague phrases and offers many
opportunities of escape to those who are intentionally trying to accom-
plish the avoidance at which the section is aimed. This section could be
established as a symbol of legislation which is passed without foresight or
meaning. Perhaps in the future, legislation will be so worded as to avoid
having to burden the courts with the necessity of interpreting vague Con-
gressional language and intent.
84 Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
35 Id. at 914.
36 Heft v. Commissioner, (C.A. 5th 1961).
37 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(d) and DeWind and Anthoine, Collapsible
Corporations, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 475 (1956), for a further discussion of limitations on
collapsible treatment.
